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FIRST AMENDMENT

The Government's Enforcement of Draft Registration:
Prosecutionor Persecution?
by Joel M. Gora

David Alan Wayte
V.

United States
(Docket No. 83-1292)
Argued November 6, 1984
It is fitting that this case, Wayte v. United States, will be
argued before the Supreme Court on Election Day,
1984, when Americans will go to the polls to choose a
President. For the issues in this case ultimately trace
back to the last Presidential election. InJuly, 1980, President Jimmy Carter, smarting from the continued American hostage situation in Iran, deeply concerned about
the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and sure to
face an indignant Ronald Reagan in the fall elections,
took the first initial steps to reactivate the military draft
registration system. Acting under a congressional statute, he authorized the Selective Service System to begin
registering all young men aged eighteen, nineteen or
twenty. Although Congress would have to act to reinstitute the draft itself, the registration requirement was
viewed as a way to expedite any draft that might
thereafter be authorized.
In the months that followed, millions of young men
dutifully trooped to their local post offices, city halls and
government buildings to fill out Selective Service registration forms. But hundreds of thousands did not. By
mid- 1982, Selective Service officials estimated that while
approximately 8,365,000 young men had registered,
674,000 had failed to do so. Federal law makes it a
criminal offense to willfully fail to register for the draft
and carries a penalty of up to five years in jail and a $10,000 fine. With more than a half million possible law
violators walking around, how was the government
going to find out who these young men were, let alone
decide what to (1 about them?
A few young men made the first problem easy: they
stepped forward and identified themselves as nonregistrants. They did so in letters to the Selective Service
System, top government officials and even the President. Such letters typically objected to the draft on political, religious or moral grounds. Usually, the letters were
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unfailingly polite and respectful; occasionally, they were
more harsh and strident. Uniformly, the statements contained classic criticisms of national policy concerning
fundamental issues of war and peace, conscription and
freedom. Many of these self-admitted nonregistrants
repeated their views at public rallies and meetings opposing draft registration.
Starting in early 1981, the government, confronted
with extensive noncompliance, began to formulate its
enforcement response. The initial approach agreed
upon was a so-called "passive enforcement" system,
whereby the government would investigate for possible
prosecution only those nonregistrants whose identities
had come to its attention either through self-admission,
reports by third parties (e.g., neighbors reporting that
the boy next door hadn't registered) or otherwise. For
obvious reasons, the government kept this policy secret
for two years for fear that the hundreds of thousands of
nonregistrants would realize that all they had to do to
escape detection was keep quiet, not tell anyone they
hadn't registered and certainly not tell the government.
By mid-1982, as a result of the "passive" enforcement system, approximately one dozen young men.003% of the more than half-million estimated nonregistrants-were indicted for failing to register for the draft.
It came as no surprise to anyone-including the government-that each one of these defendants had been "vocal" in admitting their noncompliance either to the
government, the public, or both.
ISSUES
David Wayte's case is the first case questioning the
"passive enforcement" system to reach the Supreme
Court. It raises the issue of whether that "passive enforcement" system impermissibly focused only on those
individuals who had been identified through their vocal
opposition to draft registration, thereby stifling criticism
of government and violating the right to freedom of
speech and protest protected by the First Amendment.
In addressing that issue, the government concedes
that Wayte, or anyone else, is free to criticize the draft as
vociferously and passionately as one might choose, and
further, that it would be impermissible for government
to prosecute someone for the purpose of penalizing or
deterring the exercise of First Amendmein rights. For
this part, Wayte concedes that the act of nonregistration
itself is not protected as "symbolic speech" tnder the
First Amendment, and that the government may validly
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punish non registration-whether or not accompanied
by protest or evidenced by dissent.
But that is where consensus ends. In the government's view, this is basically not a First Amendment case.
Rather, the government characterizes the matter as a
"selective prosecution" problem-that is, whether Wayte
was singled out for prosecution from among other similarly-situated people because he protested draft registration, or for any other impermissible reason. The
government contends he was not, reasoning that he was
selected by virtue of the passive enforcement system,
which was designed to be the least costly and cumbersome way to identify and prosecute violators, not punish
dissenters. In this view, Wayte's letter of protest was not
so much an expression of views as a confession of guilt.
The government says it simply pursued suspected law
violators who came to its attention.
Wayte counters that this is basically a First Amendment case, rather than a selective prosecution problem.
In his view, whether the government intended to single
him out is irrelevant, as is the motive for adopting the
"passive enforcement" system itself. Instead, Wayte argues, the focus must be on the effects of the adoption of
the passive enforcement system on punishing dissent.
Since the very nature of the system guaranteed that only
those few young men who were vocal about their noncompliance would be pursued-whether or not that was
what the government intended-the system itself was "a
First Amendment trip wire," stacked against free speech
and dissent.
FACTS
In August of 1980, shortly after President Carter
initiated draft registration, David Wayte, a twenty-yearold Yale University student from Pasadena, California,
wrote to the Selective Service advising that he had not
registered, planned never to do so and accepted the
consequences of his action. That same day, he wrote to
President Carter explaining his decision and criticizing
the President's actions. In that letter Wayte stated:
I love my country. I believe that its Constitution is close
to perfect, its laws the most just in the world. That is why it
pains me deeply when a law is enacted which contradicts the
basic tenets of freedom and democracy upon which my
country was founded. You enacted such a law when you
signed the draft registration bill ....
I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I
did not register for your draft.
Several months later, in February of 1981, Wayte
wrote again to the Selective Service, reminding them of
his August letter, reaffirming his intention never to
register and wondering why he had not heard from
them:
I must interpret your silence as meaning that you are
too busy or disorganized to respond to letters or to keep
-track of us draft-age youth. So I will keep you posted of my
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whereabouts. For the forseeable fiture, I will be traveling
the nation by foot, encouraging resistance and spreading
the word about peace and disarmament.
The government indeed was rather busy-trying to
figure out what to do about the problem. The solution
was the "passive enforcement" system. Under that system, the government would not actively seek to identify
the hundreds of thousands of young men who had .ot
registered, but would concentrate on investigating the
hundred or so names that had come in one way or
another to Selective Service attention. Some individuals,
like David Wayte, had self-reported their nonregistration. Most others had been reported by neighbors, relatives or acquaintances. Presumably, almost all of the
people reported by others had stated to someone that
they had not registered. According to a Justice Department memorandum, government officials anticipated
that: "The first wave of referrals will consist of names of
young men who fall into two categories: 1) those who
wrote to the Selective Service and said they refused to
register, and 2) those whose neighbors and others reported them as persons who refused to register."
In July, 1981, the Selective Service referred a list of
134 names to the Department of Justice for further
investigation, looking toward prosecution. Following referral to local federal prosecutors, this list was considerably winnowed down through a so-called "beg policy"
whereby the prosecutor wrote each individual and offered a last opportunity to register and thereby avoid
prosecution. Most on the list availed themselves of the
chance. Others were eliminated when it turned out they
were inappropriate for registration; for example, eleven
were women, one was an eighty-year-old man, and a few
names were fictitious.
In March, 1982, following a three-month grace period announced by President Reagan to encourage
registration, officials in the Department of Justice decided to authorize local federal prosecutors to begin
indicting the few people remaining on the list. Government officials recognized that: "The first prosecutions
were liable to consist of a large sample of: 1) persons
who object on religious and moral grounds, and 2) persons who publicly refuse to register." And these officials
candidly worried that launching indictments against
such few and vocal individuals identified through the
passive enforcement system would "undoubtedly" lead
to claims of selective prosecution brought in retribution
for exercising First Amendment rights. This was particularly true since, as one official noted: "The chances
that a quiet nonregistrant will be prosecuted is probably
about the same as the chances that he will be struck by
lightning."
Despite these concerns, the officials claimed they had
no alternati'e but to proceed. Attempts to develop an
"active" enforcement system to identify the half million
nonregistrants had been difficult. Access to Social SecuPREVIEW

rity records had been blocked by a court ruling that
required an Act of Congress to change. Even after gaining access to Social Security information for computer
matching purposes, Selective Service officials were still
stymied by lack of addresses of suspected violators.
Moreover, using state drivers license information was
also claimed to be inadequate and irregular; although a
law student researcher for Wayte was able, in a day, to
identify several states that would easily make drivers lists
available at a modest cost.
In addition to claiming that implementing an active
enforcement system was diffictult, the government also
insisted that it had valid reasons for proceeding against
Wayte and his dozen fellow nonregistrants. Those individuals had adamantly persisted in their refusal to register, their self-admitted refusals would help prove the
willfullness of their actions at trial, and their prosecution
would help encourage the hundreds of thousands of
other nonregistrants to comply with the law. Wayte contended, however, that the prosecutions of vocal objectors would encourage silence, not compliance. The
message would not be that violators would be punished,
but that protestors would be. Wayte further contended
that this could have been avoided had the government
initially developed an active enforcement policy that
would have identified large number of nonregistrants
and then investigated a portion of them at random-the
kind of system that the government finally put in place
by the end of 1982. In the meantime, however, proceeding with prosecutions of those identified under the "passive" system guaranteed, according to Wayte, that the
handful of young men prosecuted would all be vocal
protestors. And that was what resulted. Of thirteen men
indicted in 1982, all were self-admitted, vocal dissenters.
Only three other individuals were to be indicted in the
next two years.
Wayte was indicted in federal Gourt in Los Angeles in
July of 1982, two years after President Carter's draft
registration proclamation. The district court granted
Wayte a hearing on his claim of selective prosecution. In
November, 1982, the district court ruled that Wayte had
been impermissibly selected for investigation and prosecution because of his exercise of First Amendment
rights. The court also ruled that the Carter Proclamation was invalid because of administrative irregularities
surrounding its promulgation. On both grounds, the
court dismissed Wayte's indictment. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
this decision was overturned by a three-judge appellate
panel, with one dissent. The Supreme Court agreed to
review that ruling, but limited the hearing to the question of selective prosecution for the exercise of First
Amendment rights, not the validity of the Carter Proclamation.

Issue No. 4

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The power to prepare for war is the federal government's most awesome authority. For that reason, not
surprisingly, the war power has been subject to frequent
constitutional objections. The Civil War generated challenges to the President's power to subject civilians to
military rule. During World War 1,the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of conscription as against a claim that
the draft constituted "involuntary servitude" prohibited
by the Constitution. Even more pertinently, that war,
which produced prosecutions of' dissenters who advocated resistance to the draft and the military, afforded
the Supreme Court its first opportunity to probe the
meaning of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Those cases fashioned the famous "clear
and present danger" formula for assessing the line between valid protest and impermissible incitement of law
violation. World War I1led to a number of' Court rulings exploring the extent to which the government
could regulate almost the entire fabric of the national
life in the cause of mobilizing for war.
During the Viet Nam war, the Court was kept busy
addressing the claims of religious and moral objectors to
military service. The Viet Nam conflict also resulted in
an important Court ruling that bears on David Wayie's
case-namely that whatever rights of free speech are
implicated in the public and symbolic burning of a draft
card are outweighed by the government's neutral purpose, not involving the suppression of dissent, of requiring those eligible to possess such cards in order to
administer the selective service system.
Although the nation is not at war now, the 1980 draft
registration proclamation has spawned its own round of'
constitutional challenges. In 1981, the Coturt upheld tile
registration system against the claim that it violated
equal protection of the law because only young muen, not
young women, were compelled to register. The Court
ruled that male only registration was valid because only
men were eligible for combat duty and the purpose of
draft registration was to provide a ready pool of combat
personnel. Earlier this year, the Court upheld the Solomon Amendment-an Act of Congress requiring that
male college students applying for federal financing
state whether they had registered with Selective Service
and suffer a loss of aid if they had not. The Court
rejected arguments that the arrangement constituted an
impermissible kind of legislative punishment and violated the privilege against self-incrimination, reasoning
that no one was forced to apply for the funds.
In this, the Court's third encounter with President
Carter's Proclamation, Wayte seems to be swimming
against the tide of adjudication. But since lie invokes the
unique protections of the First Amendment, which occupies a preferred position in our constitutional system,
his chance of success should not be discounted. The
Court has long been sensitive to government suppres91

sion of dissent, notjust when the law specifically makes it
a crime to say certain things, but also when the enforcement of a seemingly neutral law seems to pose an undue
risk of targeting on or "chilling" freedom of speech or
press. Accordingly, Wayte argues that the passive enforcement scheme, whether or not devised with a motive
to punish dissenters, would necessarily have that effect,
as the government officials were well aware. Since the
system was targeted only on dissenters the scheme violated the First Amendment. Because the government
had alternatives readily available to pursue its valid enforcement objectives-most notably the active enforcement system it has since implemented-there was no
compelling justification for having adopted the scheme
which resulted in the prosecution of Wayte and other
protestors.
While Wayte stresses these First Amendment attacks
on the passive enforcement scheme, the government
contends that such points are of secondary significance;
the primary question is whether the system embodied an
impermissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Accordingly, the government emphasizes the long
sett!ed rule that: "The decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in [the government's] discretion." Because of this rule, broadly deferential to
prosecutorial decisionmaking, the Court rarely hears
cases involving a claim of impermissible prosecutorial
discretion. But the Court has not suggested that prosecutors have wholly unfettered discretion in selecting
whom to prosecute, and the Justices have left the door
slightly ajar, by noting that prosecutorial selectivity is
subject to some constitutional constraints.
Because of this, the lower courts have developed a
two-part formula to judge a selective prosecution claim:
1) Was the defendant singled out for prosecution from
among others similarly situated, and 2) Was such discrimination based on impermissible factors such as race
or the exercise of free speech rights. Pursuant to this
approach, lower courts have occasionally thrown out
convictions. Indeed, the appellate court that ruled
against Wayte had previously accepted a similar claim of
vocal protestors against compliance with the census who
charged that they were impermissibly singled out for
prosecution for refusing to cooperate and supply census
information. The Wayte case is the first Supreme Court
encounter with such a claim of selectivity to punish
dissenters.
The government concedes the validity of the twopart formula for measuring selective prosecution claims,
but insists that the standards have not been met. The
government argues that Wayte and the others prosecuted were treated no differently than any other nonregistrants whose identities and whereabouts were known,
who admitted noncompliance and who rejected the "beg
policy" last opportunity to register and avoid prosecu92

tion. Similarly, even assuming for the sake of argument
that these young men were treated differently, the
needs of a developing enforcement policy justified the
government's decision to proceed with their cases while
a more comprehensive enforcement system was being
implemented. Thus, the government concludes, there
was no impermissible selection of the defendant.
In terms of the potential significance of the Court's
decision in this case, there is an interesting juxtaposition
of consequences. Although Wayte stresses the First
Amendment features of this case, neither a victory nor a
defeat will have farreaching free speech consequences.
This is not a case involving broad and recurring questions such as the First Amendment limits on libel law,
the measure of protection for commercial speech or
obscenity and the use of the streets or other public
places for picketing and demonstrating. No one disputes
that Wayte was free to criticize the draft registration,
while, conversely, the government was entitled to prosecute men who failed to register for the draft. The question is whether the decision to prosecute the latter was
inevitably likely to punish only the former. Since this
type of First Amendment problem arises only in occasional and unusual situations, the Court's ruling, whichever way it goes, is not likely to have much impact on
First Amendment law.
A ruling in Wayte's favor, however, is likely to have a
significant impact, not on the First Amendment law that
Wayte now stresses, but on the selective prosecution
doctrine that he won on in a lower court and that the
government claims has not been breached. The Court
has rarely considered, let alone upheld, a selective prosecution contention. If the Court agrees with the government, the ruling will probably not close the door io
all selective prosecution claims, but will probably only
conclude that impermissible selectivity has not been proven in this case. If the Court rules against the government, however, even though in the context of claimed
discrimination against free speech, the practical consequences will be widespread, because the Court will have
validated a selective prosecution claim, thereby inviting
defendants to raise such objections far more often than
is presently done. Thus, in terms of the development of
the law, the government has far more to lose from an
unfavorable decision than it stands to gain from a favorable ruling.
ARGUMENTS
ForDavidAlan Wayte (Counsel of Record, Mark D. Rosenbaum,
633 S. Shatto Place, Los Angeles, CA 90005; telephone (213)
437-1720)

1. The passive enforcement system was an impermissible, content-based regulatory policy that targeted and
burdened protected political speech opposing draft
registration.
2. The question of governmental motive is irrelevant to
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a First Amendment analysis of the passive system's
impact on protected expression.
3. Since the government's enforcement policy burdens
political speech, the burden was on the United States
to show that the policy furthered compelling interests, without unnecessarily limiting protected speech.
The government has not met that burden because it
could have achieved its objectives in ways that would
not have resulted in prosecuting only vocal nonregistrants.

own admissions. The passive enforcement system that
resulted in prosecuting people like Wayte was a valid
initial phase of a more comprehensive enforcement
program being developed and did not base prosecutions on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
2. For similar reasons, the selection of Wayte for prosecution did not violate the First Amendment because
the government did not seek to punish him for*his
protest and had valid reasons, unrelated to punishing
dissent, for employing the enforcement system that
resulted in his prosecution.

For the United States (Counsel,John F. DePue, Department
of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 6332217)
1. Selecting David Wayte for prosecution did not impermissibly discriminate against him.
A. Prosecutors have broad discretion in initiating
cases and, unless deliberately based on impermissible
considerations, the exercise of discretion is not subject tojudicial scrutiny.
B. Wayte was selected for prosecution because the
government knew of his nonregistration through his

AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Wayte
The Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors,
joined by various religious and antiwar groups, filed a
brief on behalf of Wayte. These groups argued that the
prosecution violated the historic right to petition government officials for redress of grievances, recognized
by the First Amendment, as well as the rules against
unequal enforcement of the law.

ARGUMENTS: DECEMBER SESSION
Monday, November 26
1. United States v. Maine et al. (35 Orig.)
2. United States v. Louisiana et al. (9 Orig.)
3. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (821832)
4. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States (82-1922)

Tuesday, November 27

Monday, December 3

Tuesday, December 4

I. Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill (83-1362), Parma Bd. of Education
v. Donnelly (83-1363), Loudermill v.
Cleveland Bd. of Education (83-6392)
2. Heckler v. Chaney (83-1878)
3. Anderson v.City of Bessemer (83-1623)

5. Wallace v.Jaffree (83-812), Smith v.Jaffree (83-929)
6. CIA v. Sims (83-1075), Sims v. CIA (831249)
7. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (831708)
8. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (83-1452)

,4. Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management (83-5951)
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5. United States v. Sharpe (83-529)
6. Bd. of License Commissioners of Town
ofTiverton v. Pastore (83-963)
7. Atkins v. Parker (83-1660), Parker v.
Block (83-638 1)
8. Central States, SE and SW Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc.
(82-2157)

Wednesday, November 28
9. Francis v. Franklin (83-1590)
10. United States v.Johns (83-1625)
11. Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee (83-1032), Democratic Party of the
U.S. v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee (83-1122)
12.NAACP v. Hampton County Election
Comm'n (83-1015)

Wednesday, December 5
9.School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball (83-990)
10. Aguilar v. Felton (84-237), Secretary, U.
S. Dept. of Education v. Felton (84-238),
Chancellor of Bd. of Education of City
of New York v. Felton (84-239)
11. Narek v. Chesny (83-1437)
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